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I. INTRODUCTION
Few areas of current law are as controversial and incoherent as
the field of vertical price restrictions, or resale price maintenance
(RPM).' The United States Supreme Court began to develop this
body of law in 1911 with Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park &
Sons Co.2 In Dr. Miles the Court declared that RPM is a per se
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.3 Even though subse-
quent decisions have whittled away at the logical underpinnings of
Dr. Miles,4 it remains a strong limitation on manufacturer and
wholesaler vertical price fixing.
In United States v. Colgate & Co." the Court developed a ma-
jor exception to Dr. Miles. The Colgate doctrine allows a weak
form of RPM by manufacturers or wholesalers that have at-
tempted unilaterally to set prices.6 Although the Colgate doctrine
has lost much of its vitality due to years of restrictive interpreta-
tion, in Russell Stover Candies, Inc. v. FTC7 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld Colgate against a
challenge by the Federal Trade Commission. In addition, the Su-
1. Manufacturers employ RPM to control the price at which wholesalers and retailers
sell the manufacturer's product. The manufacturer, therefore, retains some control over
goods and product services even after they leave his hands.
2. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
3. Even though Dr. Miles did not use the term "per se rule," the case is the genesis of
the rule.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent part: "Every contract, combination
.... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
4. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
5. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
6. The Colgate exception represents judicial recognition of a distributor's right to do
business with dealers and retailers of his choosing, or alternatively, the exception is a legis-
lative loophole to allow purely independent business strategies to operate freely.
7. 718 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1983).
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preme Court, in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.," re-
cently intimated new-found support for the Colgate doctrine and a
possible willingness to reconsider the Dr. Miles per se prohibition
against RPM.9
The outcome of vertical pricing cases under section 1 has de-
pended upon the perceived effects of RPM on competition. Cur-
rent RPM decisions, however, rest on the principles of stare decisis
and, therefore, do not depend upon political and economic theories
that have developed since Dr. Miles.10 Early courts denounced ver-
tical restraints as analogous to horizontal price fixing, which courts
have assumed the drafters of the Sherman Act intended to pro-
hibit per se. 11 Later cases, however, illustrate that the analogy be-
tween vertical and horizontal trade restrictions is not analytically
sound, and the Supreme Court's attempt to maintain the per se
approach to RPM has led to serious theoretical and practical
problems.
12
This Note explores several problems with recent RPM deci-
sions: (1) the effect of the per se rule on producers' rights to con-
trol their marketing strategies; (2) inconsistent use of the plural
action requirement as a foil for avoiding or invoking the per se
rule; (3) the suppression of benign or procompetitive activities be-
cause of the rule; (4) the difficulties with free rider marketing; and
(5) the obstacles to advice and planning that recent decisions have
created. This Note contends that a new standard, a rebuttable pre-
sumption13 against legality, would alleviate most, if not all,
8. 104 S. Ct. 1464 (1984), af'g 684 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1981).
9. The Court, exerting considerable effort to emphasize the difficulty of distinguishing
between RPM and nonprice restraints, implied that courts must consider every possibility
that Colgate may apply before finding a manufacturer's plan illegal. See id. at 1470-71.
10. F.M. Scherer, Professor of Economics at Swarthmore College, avers that even to-
day the theory of vertical restraints is immature:
The theory is at something like the state of celestial mechanics at the time of Ptolemy
before Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler and Tycho Brahe made their contributions, i.e., eve-
rything revolved around the earth. That is essentially where economic theory is today
with respect to vertical restrictions. Law is some distance behind.
Scherer, The Economics of Vertical Restraints, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 687, 687 (1983).
11. See, e.g., Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 405-08.
12. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). Although the
Sylvania Court limited its study to nonprice vertical restrictions, the Court's logic clearly
demonstrates that the differences between horizontal and vertical restraints mandate inde-
pendent analyses.
13. A rebuttable presumption is "[a] presumption that can be overturned upon the
showing of sufficient proof .... Once evidence tending to rebut the presumption is intro-
duced, the force of the presumption is entirely dissipated and the party with the burden of
proof must come forward with evidence to avoid a directed verdict." BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
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problems that the inflexible per se rule causes.
A rebuttable presumption, followed by rule of reason analy-
sis 14 in cases in which the defendant satisfies the threshold in-
quiry,15 would restore certainty and intellectual honesty to RPM
cases. The rebuttable presumption would eliminate the need to
reconcile contrary cases and the need to consider issues that par-
ties now must address under the rule of reason. While the rebutta-
ble presumption does not require that courts maintain or reject the
Colgate doctrine,16 this Note argues that the Court could retain
Colgate but primarily rely upon the guidelines and safeguards of
the rebuttable presumption. This new line of inquiry would retain
the benefits of the per se rule-efficiency and certainty-and
would remain flexible enough to accommodate special cases in
which RPM may be beneficial to the market. In many cases, the
rebuttable presumption also would save society, courts, and liti-
gants the protracted costs of rule of reason analysis.
Part II of this Note considers major RPM cases since the early
1900s, with special focus on Russell Stover and Filco v. Amana
Refrigeration, Inc.,'17 cases which protect the defendant under the
Colgate doctrine. Part III analyzes the weaknesses of the per se
rule and the benefits that could inure to manufacturers and the
marketplace under the rebuttable presumption. Part IV examines
the strengths and weaknesses of the rule of reason and offers an
improved rule of reason approach as the second part of the rebut-
table presumption standard. Finally, Part V outlines a suggested
analysis for RPM disputes using a rebuttable presumption of ille-
gality. Part V also considers the effects of the presumption on fed-
eral antitrust laws.
ARY 1068 (5th ed. 1979).
14. Under the rule of reason "the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case
in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable
restraint on competition." Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 49.
15. To reach the rule of reason analysis, the rebuttable presumption would require a
defendant to show that its activity is benign or procompetitive at the initial pleading stage,
see FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b), (c), on motion for summary judgment, see FED. R. Civ. P. 56, or
on other appropriate motion. One advantage of the rebuttable presumption is that it would
allow the plaintiff to move for summary judgment on the presumed illegality of the defen-
dant's actions. The court then could decide whether to dispose of the action, restrain the
defendant's conduct, or order a trial under the rule of reason.
16. This Note contends that if the Supreme Court wants to preserve the Colgate ex-
ception, it could retain the exception as a safe harbor for defendants and thereby eliminate
even the abbreviated litigation that the rebuttable presumption requires.
17. 709 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1983).
[Vol. 38:163
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II. THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY
A. Minimum Price Restrictions in the Supreme Court
Vertical price restrictions are written or oral directives setting
a price above or below which a manufacturer wishes its distribu-
tors to sell. If the manufacturer establishes a price below which a
distributor should not resell a product, the manufacturer is impos-
ing minimum price RPM. Maximum price RPM-the setting of
price ceilings- and minimum RPM are per se violations of section
1 of the Sherman Act."' Nonprice vertical restrictions, however,
which include primarily territorial distributorship limitations, gen-
erally are reviewed under the rule of reason.19
1. Dr. Miles: The Per Se Rule
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.20 is the
basis of much of the current academic criticism of the Supreme
Court's RPM approach.2 ' The plaintiff Dr. Miles, a medicine man-
ufacturer, required its wholesalers and retailers to adhere to a min-
imum resale price schedule. The plaintiff also required its whole-
salers to maintain control over the retailers' subsequent resale
prices. The defendant Park & Sons, a wholesaler that refused to
purchase from Dr. Miles under the minimum price contract,
bought Dr. Miles' medicines from third parties and resold them
below the plaintiff's price schedule. The plaintiff charged the de-
fendant with inducing the plaintiff's distributors to breach their
contracts by reselling to a price cutter.22 The Court denied the
plaintiff's request for relief and held that the plaintiff's contract
provision was void under common law and the Sherman Act. 3
After determining that the agreement between Dr. Miles and
its vendees fulfilled the duality requirement of the Sherman Act,
24
18. See, e.g., California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445
U.S. 97 (1980) (minimum price RPM); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (maxi-
mum price RPM).
19. See Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the
Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 14 (1977).
20. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
21. See, e.g., R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 289 (1978); Baker, Interconnected
Problems of Doctrine and Economics in the Section One Labyrinth: Is Sylvania a Way
Out?, 67 VA. L. REv. 1457, 1463-67 (1981).
22. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 394.
23. Id. at 409.
24. Id. at 395-99. Under the duality requirement a litigant must demonstrate con-
certed action designed to fix prices that involves at least two parties. See Copperweld Corp.
v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731, 2744-45 (1984).
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the Court found that the plaintiff's resale price schedule elimi-
nated competition by controlling the price at which all purchasers
received the product.25 The Court refused to accept the defen-
dant's argument that producers of patented products have a right
ordinary sellers do not have-the right to dictate the destiny of
their products.26 The Court inquired whether the plaintiff had a
right to restrain trade. The Court held that generally a right to
control alienation does not exist without an agreement.2 7 Applying
the common-law rule that contractual restraints on alienation must
be reasonable and limited to the necessity of the circumstances, 2
the Court found that Dr. Miles' agreement did not fit any of the
common forms of acceptable restraints.29
The Court's final inquiry was whether the benefits that the
plaintiff gained from its pricing restrictions were entitled to more
protection than the property rights that the defendants had in the
medicine.30 The Court's response to this issue forms the heart of
the per se rule.3' Although the Court never explicitly condemned
all vertical price fixing agreements, it found that the effects of the
Dr. Miles scheme were the same as the effects that could result
from horizontal price fixing at the dealer level. The Court, there-
fore, held that both kinds of price fixing were illegal.3 2 The Su-
25. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 399. The Court perceived the relevant product as Dr. Miles'
medicines, not medicine in the generic sense. According to the Court, the only relevant com-
petition was intrabrand competition, not interbrand competition. The Court's analysis illus-
trates the tenuous grounds upon which it later applied the per se rule. In addition, the
Court reasoned that vertical restrictions operate like horizontal restraints and, therefore, are
equally hostile to the Sherman Act. The Court's reasoning, however, is flawed when the
plaintiff proves only intrabrand vertical restraint. The acceptability of decreased intrabrand
competition, when offset by increased interbrand competition, was the basis of the Court's
landmark decision in the area of vertical nonprice restrictions. Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50-56 (1977); see infra notes 119-28 and accompanying text
(discussing Sylvania and its impact on RPM analysis).
26. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 400-04. The Court refused to give patented products special
treatment. According to the Court "[tihe secret process may be the subject of confidential
communication and of sale or license to use with restrictions as to territory and prices ....
Here, however, the question concerns not the process of manufacture, but the manufactured
product, an article of commerce." Id. at 402.
27. Id. at 405.
28. Id. at 406.
29. Examples of acceptable restraints include singular business transactions of good
will and grants of manufacturing processes, such as patent licenses. Id. at 407.
30. Id. at 407-08.
31. Per se rules prohibit certain conduct without inquiry into possible justifications for
the conduct. Courts impose per se rules when the interests of judicial economy outweigh
other interests. See Note, Fixing the Price Fixing Confusion: A Rule of Reason Approach,
92 YALE L.J. 706, 708 (1983).
32. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 408-09.
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preme Court's focus on the effects of the alleged violative activity,
without regard to its purposes or benefits, is characteristic of other
Supreme Court per se decisions. 3
The breadth of the Dr. Miles decision is still unclear.3 4 A nar-
row interpretation of the holding is that express contractual provi-
sions restraining resale prices violate the Sherman Act. The deci-
sion left open many further questions, the first of which the Court
answered by creating the Colgate exception.
2. The Colgate Exception
The Court's 1919 decision in United States v. Colgate & Co.35
is still difficult for courts and commentators to harmonize with the
Dr. Miles rule of per se illegality.3 6 In Colgate the prosecution
charged the defendant under the Sherman Act 37 with forming an
illegal combination to fix resale prices among the wholesalers and
retailers of the defendant's soap and toilet products.3 8 Colgate cir-
culated price lists, along with provisions for penalties to distribu-
tors that did not adhere to the defendant's price lists. Colgate also
engaged in policing activities, such as obtaining information from
other distributors concerning noncomplying dealers, and request-
ing assurances from nonuniform pricers that they would comply
with the defendant's guidelines.
39
The trial court sustained the defendant's demurrer 40 and the
Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal. The Court permitted the
defendant's pricing structure based on the trial court's finding that
Colgate reserved no contractual rights in the goods after their sale
to dealers. Colgate could enforce the price restrictions only by later
refusing to deal with wholesalers and retailers that breached their
33. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 220-23 (1940)
("The elimination of so-called competitive evils is no legal justification for [violative] pro-
grams."); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 392-97 (1927) ("Agreements
which create such potential power may well be. . . unreasonable. . . without the necessity
of minute inquiry whether a particular [fixed] price is reasonable or unreasonable.").
34. For a defense of the majority position in Dr. Miles, see Andersen, The Antitrust
Consequences of Manufacturer-Suggested Retail Prices-The Case for Presumptive Ille-
gality, 54 WASH. L. REv. 763, 769 n.27 (1979).
35. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
36. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 21, at 289; Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Su-
preme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential
Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282, 287 (1975).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982); see supra note 3 (quoting provision).
38. Colgate, 250 U.S. at 302.
39. Id. at 303.
40, United States v. Colgate & Co., 253 F. 522, 528 (E.D. Va. 1918).
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contracts.41 According to the Court, because the contracts in Dr.
Miles "undertook to prevent dealers from freely exercising the
right to sell," Dr. Miles was distinguishable from Colgate.42 The
Court then laid out the Colgate doctrine: "In the absence of any
purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the [Sherman Act] does
not restrict the long recognized right of a trader or manufacturer
engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own
independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.
43 If
the Court had employed the "effects only" logic that it used in Dr.
Miles, Colgate would have been an inconsequential extension of
the Dr. Miles progeny. By blending the section 1 duality require-
ment with common-law business principles, however, the Court
created an exception to the per se rule.44
3. Narrowing Colgate
The Court quickly issued three decisions reaffirming the via-
bility of Colgate, but in increasingly narrow circumstances.45 Less
than one year after Colgate, the Court decided United States v. A.
Schrader's Son, Inc.46 Schrader's Son was factually similar to Dr.
Miles,47 but the district court initially held for the defendant, rea-
41. Colgate, 250 U.S. at 304-06. The Government maintained that the facts evidenced
a per se violation. Id. at 306. The Court, however, placed greater emphasis on the notion
that Colgate's agreements did not obligate its dealers to resell at specific prices. Id. at 306-
07.
42. Id. at 308.
43. Id. at 307.
44. Unlike Dr. Miles, Colgate is understandable from two perspectives. First, the deci-
sion is explicable on the ground that the Court adopted a strict reading of the duality re-
quirement of section 1. See supra note 24 (defining the duality requirement). Thus, a manu-
facturer who does not enter a legal relationship with its vendee cannot by itself combine,
contract, or conspire. Second, Colgate, which arguably preserves the longstanding common-
law right of a manufacturer to choose the parties with whom it deals, may represent a repu-
diation of Dr. Miles. See Baker, supra note 21, at 1473-77 (citing Pitofsky & Dam, Is the
Colgate Doctrine Dead?, 37 ANTITRUST L.J. 772, 787 (1968)).
For a list of federal appellate court cases applying Colgate, see Aladdin Oil Co. v. Tex-
aco, Inc., 603 F.2d 1107, 1114 n.8 (5th Cir. 1979).
45. FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922); Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy
Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208 (1921); United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85
(1920).
46. 252 U.S. 85 (1920).
47. In both Schrader's Son and Dr. Miles manufacturers imposed vertical price fixing
plans through express contracts with distributors. The Schrader's Son Court quoted the
district court judge's frank admission: "Personally, and with all due respect, permit me to
say that I can see no real difference upon the facts between [Dr. Miles] and [Colgate]." Id.
at 97 (quoting United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 264 F. 175, 183 (N.D. Ohio 1919)).
[Vol. 38:163
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soning that Colgate implicitly had overruled Dr. Miles.48 The Su-
preme Court reversed, stressing that its intent in Colgate was only
to preserve the manufacturer's right to announce its pricing policy
and cease to do business with dealers that failed to comply.
49
Based on this narrow interpretation of Colgate, the Court ex-
tended the scope of Dr. Miles to implicit agreements that attempt
to make resale rates binding, including agreements "implied from a
course of dealing or other circumstances." 0 The Court contrasted
Colgate's holding with situations in which "the parties are com-
bined through agreements designed to take away dealers' control
of their own affairs and thereby destroy competition." 51 This lan-
guage created a major expansion of the per se rule by shifting the
Court's inquiry from "contract" to the less restrictive term "agree-
ment." The Court's characterization of implicit agreements as sec-
tion 1 violations is the basis of most criticism of the per se rule.52
Schrader's Son did not resolve the open distinction between im-
plicit agreements that derive from dealer acceptance of fixed prices
and unilateral declarations of terms that originate from a manufac-
turer's normal course of dealing.
The Supreme Court was quick to quell rumors of Colgate's
early demise. In Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co.53 the trial
court instructed the jury that the plaintiff could prevail despite the
lack of an express or implied agreement or objections to the seller's
pricing demands.5 4 The Supreme Court held that the jury instruc-
tion was insufficient to establish the defendant's liability under
section 1. 55 Despite the Court's inability to draw a clear distinction
between Dr. Miles and Colgate, the Court refused to extend the
per se rule to prohibit inferential agreements.
The Court continued to narrow Colgate in FTC v. Beech-Nut
48. United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 264 F. 175, 182-86 (N.D. Ohio 1919).
49. 252 U.S. at 99.
50. Id. Although this statement is arguably dictum, later cases enforce the preceden-
tial value of Schrader's Son. See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960);
FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
51. Schrader's Son, 252 U.S. at 99-100.
52. The problem with using the term "agreement," and allowing inferential evidence
to prove the existence of these agreements, is that drawing a distinction between violative
conduct and the unilateral declarations of sales conditions that Colgate permits becomes
impossible. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 21, at 1477-83 & n.76; Turner, The Definition of
Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV.
L. REV. 655, 684-85 (1962).
53. 256 U.S. 208 (1921).




Packing Co.5 6 The defendant's activities in Beech-Nut were sub-
stantially similar to the defendant's activities in Colgate, yet the
Court invoked the per se rule to hold Beech-Nut liable. In both
Beech-Nut and Colgate the parties never entered a formal pricing
contract, but both defendants solicited reports on noncomplying
distributors, required assurances of future acquiescence from these
distributors, and suspended dealings with price cutters.5 7 The
Court noted that the Government had sued Beech-Nut under sec-
tion 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act 8 rather than the
Sherman Act. The Court held that although the Sherman Act's
prohibition against price fixing is only a declaration of public pol-
icy that a court considers in determining unfair methods of compe-
tition,59 the evidence, nevertheless, supported liability under either
act, because "the Beech-Nut system goes far beyond the simple
refusal to sell goods to persons who will not sell at stated prices." 60
The Court found the defendant's comprehensive RPM system as
effective at maintaining prices as similar express or implied con-
tractual provisions that courts have held violative of antitrust
law. 1
In United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. 62 the defen-
dant, Soft-Lite Lens Company, used a standard two-tier distribu-
tion system, which included distribution of published price lists.
Soft-Lite did not set ultimate consumer prices but expected retail-
ers to sell at prevailing local price schedules.6 3 The defendant en-
forced its policies through surveillance of retailers and use of prod-
uct tracing devices.6 4 The Supreme Court denied the defendant's
Colgate argument in a decision that tortured readings of precedent
and the facts at bar. The Court adopted a new threshold of liabil-
ity and stated that whether the defendant achieved its conspiracy
and combination by agreement or by wholesaler acquiescence was
56. 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
57. Id. at 445-51; Colgate, 250 U.S. at 303.
58. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982). The Act provides in relevant part: "Unfair methods of com-
petition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce, are declared unlawful." Id. § 45(a)(1).
59. Beech-Nut, 257 U.S. at 453.
60. Id. at 454.
61. Id. at 455. Justice McReynolds, the author of Colgate, Schrader's Son, and Frey &
Son, dissented in Beech-Nut because he felt that Beech-Nut was indistinguishable from
Colgate. Id. at 458-59 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
62. 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
63. Id. at 715.
64. Id. at 715-17. One method that the defendant used to trace its product was num-




By narrowing the Colgate doctrine, the Court expanded the
scope of the per se rule beyond the express contracts in Dr. Miles.
The Court extended Colgate to implied agreements in Schrader's
Son and to mere acquiescence in Bausch & Lomb. Following
Bausch & Lomb, therefore, line drawing between unilateral and
conspiratorial activities became extremely difficult.
66
4. Parke, Davis
In 1960 the Court decided its third landmark RPM case,
67
United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.,6s the most comprehensive
review of Colgate to date. Although the Court refused to uphold
the Colgate defense, the Court again recognized a manufacturer's
right to define the terms upon which it would deal with sellers.
The dissent, however, concluded that the majority's holding im-
plicitly buried Colgate.6
Defendant Parke, Davis, a pharmaceutical producer, printed
minimum resale prices in its catalogues for wholesalers. To main-
tain uniform consumer prices, the defendant also ordered direct
purchase retailers to adhere to pricing schedules.70 After some re-
tailers breached the plan by selling at a discount, the defendant
demanded that wholesalers join the defendant in refusing to sell to
the discounters. Parke, Davis told each wholesaler that all compet-
itors were subject to the same requirement. The wholesalers sup-
plied the defendant with the names of continual price cutters, and
the defendant then refused to sell to them.7 1 The defendant agreed
to resume sales only upon the assurance that the offending buyer
would adhere to the defendant's pricing policy.
The Court recognized the narrow vitality left in Colgate by
stating that the defendant loses the safe harbor by using methods
of enforcement "beyond his mere declination to sell to a customer
who will not observe his announced policy. 172 The Court deemed
65. Id. at 723.
66. One commentator felt that after Bausch & Lomb the line between unilateral and
conspiratorial activities ceased to exist. See Baker, supra note 21, at 1481 n.79.
67. The other two major RPM cases were Colgate and Dr. Miles.
68. 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
69. Id. at 49 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Parke, Davis was a five member majority deci-
sion, with one concurrence and three dissenters.
70. Id. at 32-33.
71. Id. at 33-34. The defendant's refusal included sales of prescription medicines, even
if the dealers discounted only nonprescription items.
72. Id. at 43.
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the defendant's program of refusing to deal with wholesalers to
achieve retailer compliance a violation of section 1.7- The Court
focused on the section I requirement of a "combination" between
the defendant and third parties and attempted to avoid using
loaded terms like "agreement" and "acquiescence" that the Court
used in earlier cases. 4 The Court, however, did not clarify Colgate
by relying on its combination phraseology. The majority's use of
this term has prompted a reading of Parke, Davis to mean that
Colgate only protects direct sales to retailers because the whole-
saler's conduct fulfills the requirement of a combination.1
5
Decisions since Parke, Davis continue to suggest that Colgate
is no longer good law.76 With Simpson v. Union Oil Co." the Court
began looking deeper into the reasons for buyer compliance with
RPM systems to discover whether the parties had combined to fix
prices. Defendant Union Oil Co. sold gasoline to retail dealers
under a system of one year lease and consignment agreements. The
relatively short duration of the agreements allowed the defendant
to police its RPM scheme and to terminate the plaintiff's dealer-
ship when the plaintiff failed to maintain the required prices."8
The majority, emphasizing the coercive nature of the leasing
system, relied on Parke, Davis for the proposition that Colgate
does not protect coerced RPM."9 The Court held that even coerced
compliance is sufficient to infer agreement.8 0 The Court stressed
the plight of the small struggling seller that could not fight the
defendant's power to impose noncompetitive prices.81 Thus, what
73. Id. at 45-46. Even though the group boycott undertones of the opinion are incon-
spicuous, they provide strong insight into the decision. Had the Court granted the defen-
dant in Parke, Davis a safe harbor, group boycott defendants could argue more forcefully
that Parke, Davis is precedent for extending Colgate to refusal to deal cases.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 50-52 (agreement) & 62-66 (acquiescence).
75. See Levi, The Parke, Davis-Colgate Doctrine: The Ban on Resale Price Mainte-
nance, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 258, 325. For additional discussions of Parke, Davis and its effect
on Dr. Miles and Colgate, see Fulda, Individual Refusals to Deal: When Does Single-Firm
Conduct Become Vertical Restraint?, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 590 (1965); Comment,
Unilateral Refusal to Deal: King Colgate is Dead!, 30 OHIo ST. L.J. 537 (1969).
76. The notable exception is Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1464
(1984). See infra notes 86-93 and accompanying text (discussing Monsanto).
77. 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
78. The plaintiff claimed that he sold gasoline at 27.9 cents per gallon, two cents
cheaper than the defendant desired, to meet competition. Id. at 15.
79. Id. at 17. The Court also summarily dismissed an argument that the defendant's
system of consignments shielded it from liability. Id. at 18.
80. Id. at 17. According to one commentator, "the 'agreement' need not be an agree-
ment at all, rather it may be coerced 'compliance.'" Comment, supra note 75, at 545.
81. 377 U.S. at 21.
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the Supreme Court originally perceived as a need to protect manu-
facturers from having to trade with dealers that refused to sell on
the manufacturers' terms evolved, under Simpson, into a deterrent
to manufacturer overreaching and a scheme to foster fair competi-
tion among dealers."'
Recently, the Court summarily reaffirmed the per se rule, rely-
ing primarily on the Dr. Miles rationale. In California Retail Li-
quor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. 3 the Court
struck down a state system for wine pricing among competing
wholesalers. The Court noted as support for the per se rule the
1975 repeal of the fair trade laws, which protected small businesses
from excessive price competition by allowing states to pass laws
legalizing RPM. 4 The Court felt that this legislation lent strength
to the Court's stand against vertical restrictions. Although the vi-
tality of Colgate was not at issue in Midcal1,85 the holding is consis-
tent with earlier cases that denied Colgate protection because Mid-
cal reaffirmed the per se rule against RPM.
5. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.
The recent Supreme Court decision in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-
Rite Service Corp.8 6 is a significant development in both the per se
rule and the Colgate doctrine. Petitioner Monsanto was a maker of
herbicides. Over a four year period the petitioner's share of the
corn herbicide market rose from fifteen to twenty-eight percent,
while its share of the soybean herbicide market rose from three to
nineteen percent. Respondent Spray-Rite lost its renewal of Mon-
santo's distribution rights and alleged that the petitioner conspired
to fix higher prices than the respondent's discount prices.
8 7
The Supreme Court held that while the jury may have based
its decision on sufficient evidence, the Seventh Circuit's standard
of proof was erroneous. 8 The Court did not review the merits of
82. According to Judge Posner, "[t]his rationale for the rule against resale price main-
tenance stands Dr. Miles on its head . . . . The two grounds . . . cannot be reconciled."
Posner, supra note 36, at 290.
83. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
84. Id. at 102-03; see Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89
Stat. 801 (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 45(a) (1976)).
85. The central issue in Midcal was whether the state immunity doctrine of Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), protected the price fixing plan. 445 U.S. at 103.
86. 104 S. Ct. 1464 (1984).
87. Id. at 1467.
88. Id. at 1470-71. The Supreme Court defined the correct threshold of proof that the
plaintiff must meet:
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the per se rule 9 or even address Colgate, except to establish the
proper standard of proof.90 The Court, however, did try to protect
the Colgate doctrine 9' by discussing section I combination in terms
of the contract concept of a "meeting of the minds," rather than
more liberal terms like "acquiescence" and "coerced adherence"
that the Court used in Parke, Davis.92 In addition, the Court con-
ceded that the economic impact of conduct that is per se illegal
and conduct that Colgate allows is almost always identical.9 3 Mon-
santo illustrates the Court's current willingness to reconsider Dr.
Miles. The case is the Court's strongest statement of support for
the per se rule in decades, even though the facts of Monsanto did
not present a direct confrontation between Colgate and Dr. Miles.
6. Filco v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc.
Although the Supreme Court has narrowed significantly the
Colgate doctrine, Colgate remains popular with the lower federal
courts. A discussion of the way lower courts have interpreted the
Supreme Court's per se analysis is helpful in understanding the
Court's approach.9 4 In Filco v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc.9 5 the
Ninth Circuit upheld an alleged RPM defendant's motion for sum-
[Slomething more than evidence of complaints is needed. There must be evidence that
tends to exclude the possibility that the manufacturer and nonterminated distributors
were acting independently . . . . [T]he antitrust plaintiff should present direct or cir-
cumstantial evidence that reasonably tends to prove that the manufacturer and others
"had a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful
objective."
Id. at 1471 (quoting Edward J. Sweeney & Sons v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 111 (3d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981)).
89. In a celebrated amicus curiae brief, former Assistant Attorney General William F.
Baxter urged the Court to reconsider the tenets of the per se rule. The Court, explicitly
declining the invitation, noted that neither party to the case had argued the point at trial or
on appeal. 104 S. Ct. at 1469 n.7.
90. Although the Monsanto Court discussed Colgate, the Court did not apply Colgate
to the facts of Monsanto. Id. at 1470.
91. See, e.g., id. at 1470 ("[I]t is of considerable importance that independent action
by the manufacturer, and concerted action on nonprice restrictions, be distinguished from
price-fixing agreements, since under present law the latter are subject to per se treatment
92. Id. In an important footnote, the Court reasoned:
The concept of "a meeting of the minds" or "a common scheme" in a distributor-
termination case includes more than a showing that the distributor conformed to the
suggested price. It means as well that evidence must be presented both that the dis-
tributor communicated its acquiescence or agreement, and that this was sought by the
manufacturer.
Id. at 1470 n.9.
93. Id. at 1470.
94. For a list of federal appellate court cases applying Colgate, see Aladdin Oil Co. v.
Texaco, Inc., 603 F.2d 1107, 1114 n.8 (5th Cir. 1979).
95. 709 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 385 (1983).
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mary judgment. The defendant, an appliance manufacturer, sent
its agent to sell appliances to the plaintiff. The representative at-
tempted to stop the plaintiff's price cutting96 and complained
about the plaintiff's allegedly insufficient displays, product line,
and presale services.97 Amana subsequently refused further direct
sales to the plaintiff.
Relying on Albrecht v. Herald Co.,9e the Filco court inquired
whether the defendant had pressured the plaintiff into setting
prices and whether the defendant "actually impinged upon [the]
plaintiff's freedom to set prices." 99 The court rejected the plain-
tiff's argument that it had acquiesced in the scheme because the
plaintiff initially had claimed that its noncompliance had resulted
in its termination. The court's finding that these two theories were
mutually exclusive'00 reflects the problem that courts face in trying
to interpret Supreme Court precedent. A dealer may acquiesce
temporarily to a distributor's pricing demands, but then cease to
comply and lose the distributor's account. The Filco court's desire
to characterize the defendant's actions as "mere exposition, per-
suasion, argument, or pressure,"''1 rather than coercion, was an-
other indication that the court was sympathetic to the defendant.
7. Summary
With the exception of Monsanto, the Supreme Court continu-
ally has reasserted the viability of Colgate, yet has refused to pro-
tect it. 10 2 The rule against RPM originally required the existence of
an express contractual price demand.0 3 In Schrader's Son the
96. The representative allegedly told the plaintiff: "I don't want Amana to be dis-
counted. I don't want to make a K-Mart out of Amana, you know, with the low prices ....
If you want to have Amana, you have to do so and so. You have to maintain the price. You
cannot discount it." Id. at 1263.
97. Id. The plaintiff also accused the defendant of terminating the plaintiff's account
because of complaints about the plaintiff's low prices. Based on Colgate, the court found no
nexus between the complaints and the termination. Id. at 1261-66.
98. 390 U.S. 145 (1968); see infra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
99. 709 F.2d at 1266.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1263 (citations omitted).
102. See R & G Affiliates, Inc. v. Knoll Int'l, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 1395, 1399 (S.D.N.Y.
1984). Colgate, nonetheless, remains vital among the federal appellate courts. See Aladdin
Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 603 F.2d 1107, 1114 n.8 (5th Cir. 1979) (listing federal courts of
appeal that have applied Colgate).
103. A narrow reading of Dr. Miles and Colgate's subsequent interpretation of Dr.
Miles implies that the per se rule extends only to express contracts.
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Court expanded the boundaries of the per se rule to include agree-
ments implied from a course of dealing.104 The rule gradually in-
creased in scope at the expense of the Colgate defense. Parke, Da-
vis imposed liability for combinations that set prices;105 Simpson
culminated the expansion by focusing on the prohibition of coer-
cive tactics.10 6 The recent Monsanto decision may reflect a reversal
of Supreme Court thinking about Colgate. The status of vertical
price restraints in the Court, nonetheless, remains problematic.
The Court currently imposes liability for policed acquiescence and
coercion in cases that are factually similar to Colgate.1
07
B. Maximum Price Restrictions: Albrecht and Maricopa
In 1968 the Court extended the Parke, Davis prohibition of
RPM to maximum price fixing systems. 08 In Albrecht v. Herald
Co.109 the Court applied the combination requirement of Parke,
Davis to the joint activities of a newspaper company, a telephone
solicitation service, and a newspaper carrier that together acted to
replace the plaintiff as the paper's carrier. 1 0 The Court, relying on
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc."' to justify
use of the per se rule in maximum price fixing cases, reasoned that
"schemes to fix maximum prices, by substituting the perhaps erro-
neous judgment of a seller for the forces of the competitive market,
may severely intrude upon the ability of buyers to compete and
104. United States v. A. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85, 99 (1920).
105. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 43-45 (1960).
106. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 17 (1964).
107. See, e.g., Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1980). In Colgate the de-
fendant certainly was economically superior to its many dealers, and the Court's recited
facts included policing activities, promises from recalcitrant buyers as a condition of further
sales, and dealer adherence to suggested prices. 250 U.S. at 303-04; see also Comment, supra
note 75, at 538 (concluding that the facts of Colgate clearly support a finding of
combination).
108. For a definition of maximum price RPM, see supra text accompanying note 18.
109. 390 U.S. 145, reh'g denied, 390 U.S. 1018 (1968).
110. Id. at 149. In a footnote, Justice White, writing for the majority, stated:
Under Parke, Davis petitioner could have claimed a combination between respondent
and himself, at least as of the day he unwillingly complied with respondent's advertised
price. Likewise, he might successfully have claimed that respondent had combined with
other carriers because the firmly enforced price policy applied to all carriers, most of
whom acquiesced in it.
Id. at 150 n.6. This comment virtually swallows Colgate but is dictum, and the Court never
has applied this reasoning.
111. 340 U.S. 211 (1951). In Kiefer-Stewart the respondent established agreements to
sell liquor only to wholesalers who would resell the liquor below the respondent's price ceil-
ings. The Court held that maximum price RPM inhibited the dealers' rights to select a fair
price for their products just as effectively as minimum price RPM. Id. at 213.
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survive in that market."'12 The Court also cited as pernicious the
tendency of a maximum price fixing system to eliminate nonprice
competition, to favor volume dealers, and to operate as both a
price floor and a price ceiling."1
3
Recently, in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society,"4
the Court relied on Albrecht as controlling precedent. In Maricopa
a group of doctors established maximum fee schedules for policy-
holders of certain insurance plans. The agreement provided that
insurers would pay doctors' fees up to the maxima and that the
doctors would consider these fees payment in full." 5 Although the
facts disclosed a horizontal price fix, the Court relied on the verti-
cal per se rule to condemn the activity."16 The Court considered
briefly the detriments unique to the payment plan," 7 but consis-
tent with per se analysis, refused to consider the alleged benefits of
the plan.""
C. Nonprice Restrictions: Sylvania
The Court cast serious doubt on the validity of the Dr. Miles
per se rule in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,' 9 a
landmark nonprice restriction case. Sylvania, a manufacturer of
color television sets with a dwindling one or two percent national
sales share, limited distribution of its sets in an attempt to reduce
intrabrand competition,110 increase profits, and encourage dealers
to promote Sylvania products more aggressively. In three years the
defendant's share of the market jumped to five percent.'2 ' When a
franchisee challenged Sylvania's new policy, the Court rescinded
112. 390 U.S. at 152-53.
113. Id. at 153. See generally Popofsky, Resale Price Restraints Revisited, 49 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 109, 116-17 (1980) (discussing Albrecht).
114. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
115. Id. at 339-40.
116. Id. at 348 & n.18.
117. Id.
118. The respondents alleged that the plan enabled patients to choose their own doc-
tors, to rely upon complete insurance coverage, and to pay lower premiums. Id. at 351 &
n.23 (quoting United States v. Socony-Vacuun Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940)). The dissent
disagreed with the majority's reasoning and relied on Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc.,
441 U.S. 1 (1979), reh'g denied, 450 U.S. 1050 (1981), and National Soc'y of Professional
Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978), to criticize the per se analysis. 457 U.S. at 362-
64 (Powell, J., dissenting).
119. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
120. Intrabrand competition is competition among retailers of a single manufacturer's
product. In contrast, "[i]nterbrand competition is the competition among the manufacturers
of the same generic product. . . and is the primary concern of antitrust law." Id. at 52 n.19.
121. Id. at 38.
19851 179
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
its per se rule against territorial restraints12 2 and established the
rule of reason. 2  The Court, finding for Sylvania, relied more heav-
ily than ever before, or since, on scholarly opinion 2 4 to support the
conclusion that territorial restrictions have no "pernicious effect on
competition.' ' 25 The Court acknowledged the benefits to inter-
brand competition when retailers receive protection from full in-
trabrand competition and are able to increase dealer services and
advertising.
The Court held that it could apply the per se rule only when it
had evidence of a demonstrable economic effect, a test that Justice
White argued in his concurrence would militate forcefully against
applying the per se rule in RPM cases as well.2 6 The majority,
weakly rebutting Justice White's argument, found significant dif-
ferences between nonprice restrictions and RPM that easily could
justify different treatment. 27 The Court pointed to the invariable
tendency for RPM to decrease interbrand competition and in-
crease the likelihood of cartels. The Court also emphasized Con-
gress' implicit condemnation of price restrictions when it repealed
the fair trade laws. 28 Sylvania evinces the Court's modern view
that economic and pragmatic factors militate in favor of allowing
manufacturers to retain some control over their downstream
distribution.
122. The Supreme Court first announced the per se rule for nonprice vertical re-
straints in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
123. For a definition of the rule of reason, see supra note 14.
124. The Court cited more than 15 scholarly articles in its majority opinion.
125. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 50 (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).
126. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 67-70 (White, J., concurring).
127. Id. at 51 n.18.
128. Id. Although a full discussion of the implications of Sylvania is beyond the scope
of this Note, the prevailing view among a majority of the members of the Supreme Court is
that RPM is unique and, therefore, outside the purview of rule of reason analysis. See id. In
Sylvania the Court held that it would permit reduced intrabrand competition if sufficiently
offset by increases elsewhere. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 50-54. This line of thinking questions
Dr. Miles' reliance on perceived injury to intrabrand competition as the basis of a per se
rule against RPM. See Baker, supra note 21, at 1465; cf. Andersen, supra note 34, at 769
n.27 (noting the perceived economic injury in Dr. Miles).
Drawing a line between RPM and territorial restrictions is difficult. See Baker, supra
note 21, at 1467 (discussing the overlap between territorial restrictions and RPM). One com-
mentator concluded that no policy justification exists for subjecting vertical restraints to
two rules. See Bork, Vertical Restraints: Schwinn Overruled, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 171, 173,
190. Sylvania also implicitly supports the Colgate doctrine because of the Court's willing-
ness to recognize the value of the manufacturer's interest in maintaining control over its
goods. For further discussion of Sylvania, see Baker, supra note 21.
[Vol. 38:163
RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
D. Lower Court Interpretations of Colgate
1. Russell Stover Candies, Inc.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) recently challenged the
validity of the Colgate doctrine in In re Russell Stover Candies,
Inc.'29 The Commission brought the case as a test 130 stipulating
the facts for purposes of its prosecution. Respondent Russell Sto-
ver, a major seller and maker of various candies, had designated
resale prices for its products through price lists, invoices, order
forms, and prepriced packages.' 3 ' Russell Stover also had informed
retailers that discounting its products would result in cancellation
of further dealings, but it neither requested nor accepted express
assurances of pricing. 3 2 The respondent not only ceased dealing
with price cutters, but also refused initial contact with retailers
that it believed intended low price resales. 3 Russell Stover's plan
was so effective that a Louis Harris survey estimated a 97.4 per-
cent retailer compliance rate. 3 4 Potential witnesses before the
FTC intended to testify that they wanted to sell at lower prices
but maintained the designated rates for fear of termination. 3 5
When the parties stipulated the facts, the focus of the case
became the viability of the Colgate doctrine. The FTC did not at-
tempt to demonstrate the existence of policing activities, threats of
termination, economic coercion, or the reinstatement of price cut-
ters. 3 The case plainly presented the issue whether the expanding
per se rule still would permit unilateral acts by a manufacturer.
The administrative law judge relied on Colgate to sanction the
manufacturer's plan and dismiss the FTC complaint.
(a) The FTC Opinion: Colgate Overruled
The FTC overruled and reversed the administrative law judge.
It held that a combination existed between Russell Stover and its
acquiescent retailers by reasoning that some of the dealers would
have discounted their prices if Russell Stover had not threatened
129. 100 F.T.C. 1 (1982), rev'd, 718 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1983).
130. Id. at 7.
131. Id. at 4-5.
132. Id. at 5.
133. Id. at 6.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See Kilburn, Other Vertical Problems: Pricing, Refusals to Deal, Distribution, 51
ANTITRUST L.J. 173, 174-75 (1982).
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termination.'37 In evaluating the per se rule, the FTC stated that
decisions after Colgate would have ruled that the defendant in
Colgate itself violated the Sherman Act. 138 The FTC relied on
Parke, Davis and Albrecht for the proposition that a conspiracy
may occur even when retailers comply out of fear of termination. 3 9
The Commission concluded that the Colgate exception only ap-
plied to initial customer selection; any later use would constitute a
combination.
40
(b) The Eighth Circuit Reversal
The Eighth Circuit, reversing the FTC and dismissing the
complaint, found the stipulated facts insufficient to establish lia-
bility under the Colgate doctrine.' Petitioner Russell Stover ar-
gued that the FTC's unwilling acquiescence test missed the point
of Colgate-that the unilateral actions of a manufacturer become
no less unilateral simply because a dealer responds. 42 Russell Sto-
ver also argued that the FTC's rule could lead to abuse by dealers
that, fearing termination because of poor productivity, could claim
that they adhered to a manufacturer's price because of coercion,
threat, or pressure.143 Finally, Russell Stover averred that subjec-
tive dealer inquiries defeated the per se rule's implicit requirement
of significant market power in the manufacturer.144 Absent market
power, Russell Stover argued, a manufacturer has no way to make
137. 100 F.T.C. at 18.
138. Id. at 21 n.16. The FTC summarized its view of Colgate's remains as follows:
An announced policy of terminating non-complying dealers, standing alone, does not
automatically create a combination because such a policy standing alone does not nec-
essarily imply any dealers act to avoid the carrying out of the threat. However, if, as is
likely, some dealers do act to avoid termination, their unwilling compliance does give
rise to combinations.
Id. at 40-41 (emphasis in original).
139. Id. at 34-35.
140. Id. at 46. FTC Chairman Miller dissented, reasoning that the majority's test
made Colgate "applicable only in situations where it is irrational and futile for a manufac-
turer to make the 'protected threat' in the first place." Id. at 50 (Miller, Chairman,
dissenting).
141. Russell Stover Candies, Inc. v. FTC, 718 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1983).
142. Petitioner's Brief at 36-37, Russell Stover, 718 F.2d 256. Russell Stover con-
tended: "The Court has never inquired into the reaction of the retailers to an announcement
because the reaction was irrelevant to the unilateral nature of the announcement itself
.... The dealer's reasons for observing the suggested retail price do not affect the unilat-
eral nature of the manufacturer's policy." Id. Russell Stover also relied on Parke, Davis. Id.
at 37 (quoting Parke, Davis, 362 U.S. at 44).
143. Petitioner's Brief at 37-38, Russell Stover, 718 F.2d 256.
144. Id. at 40-41.
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its dealers comply.
145
The Eighth Circuit agreed with Russell Stover's argument that
the stipulated facts failed to constitute a sufficient "plus factor" to
imply a combination agreement. 146 The court refuted the view that
plus factors are unnecessary under the Albrecht dicta. 47 The
Eighth Circuit felt that the Supreme Court did not indicate
whether unwilling compliance alone was enough to support a com-
bination claim or whether coercive tactics must induce the unwill-
ing compliance, as in Parke, Davis.148 The court, therefore, refused
to overrule Colgate on such inferential grounds.
49
145. Id. Significantly, Russell Stover did not make a product that was its retailers'
primary source of income-such as gasoline, electronic equipment, or drugs-but instead
provided candy as one of a wide variety of items that the retailer sold. See Russell Stover,
100 F.T.C. at 4. This distinction reduces the dealer's economic interest in the manufac-
turer's unilateral activity to the level of the reseller in Colgate. Although the distinction is
not relevant under the per se rule, the distinction is implicit in the fact finding process. See
Parke, Davis, 362 U.S. at 31-36; Bausch & Lomb, 321 U.S. at 709-16; see supra text accom-
panying notes 62-65 & 68-71.
146. Russell Stover, 718 F.2d at 260. "Plus factors" are manufacturer actions that ex-
ceed the parameters of Colgate.
147. See Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 150 n.6.
148. 718 F.2d at 259.
149. Several other federal courts also have considered the issues in Russell Stover. For
example, in Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 1982),
Judge Posner considered a suit by a wholesaler who charged its supplier with wrongful ter-
mination. The wholesaler accused the supplier of engaging in both RPM and restricted dis-
tribution. The court, however, found no violation of the Sherman Act under either the per
se rule or the rule of reason. Judge Posner applied the rule of reason to the combined price
and nonprice restraint system, which the court apparently accepted as beyond the ambit of
the per se rule. See id. at 744. The court held that absent evidence of "signficant market
power," the plaintiff did not meet its burden, because smaller firms cannot afford to injure
customers, and market forces can correct any errors. Id. at 745. The court required the
defendant to possess market power, which the court could infer from the "power to raise
prices significantly above the competitive level without losing all of one's business." Id. Al-
though a restrictive definition, the concept of market power as a liability yardstick comes
from Sylvania. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 38-39, 53 & n.22; see also Goldberg, Resale Price
Maintenance and the FTC: The Magnavox Investigation, 23 WM. & MARY L. REv. 439
(1982) (discussing the restricted distribution system of the third largest color television
maker).
In Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1980), the Second Circuit attempted to
avoid the per se rule. Defendant Texaco continually threatened to terminate the plaintiff's
lease and dealership unless the plaintiff observed maximum price ceilings. The Yentsch
court adopted an expansive reading of the per se rule and concluded that the defendant
"creat[ed] a coercive business climate." Id. at 53. The Second Circuit imposed liability de-
spite the plaintiff's three brief acquiescences to Texaco's demands. The Yentsch court's
reading of the law clearly reflects a narrow interpretation of Colgate.
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2. Arnott v. American Oil Co.
The Eighth Circuit also considered a combination situation in
Arnott v. American Oil Co. 15 0 The majority found an illegal combi-
nation between defendant Amoco and plaintiff Arnott, lessee of an
Amoco gas station. The majority based its finding on evidence of
Amoco's pricing demands, intermittent one year lease renewal re-
fusals, and eventual termination of Arnott's lease in part for rais-
ing prices against the defendant's directives.
Judge Bright, who concurred in part and dissented in part,
considered Arnott's antitrust claim dubious and based on an incor-
rect interpretation of Colgate.'5' He contended that Arnott en-
joyed inflexible demand due to his location on an interstate high-
way, away from competitors.152 In addition, Amoco calculated its
lease receipts from the number of gallons of fuel that its lessees
purchased.5 3 No combination between the litigants existed, ac-
cording to Judge Bright, because Arnott failed to prove that he
ever had changed his price in response to Amoco's directives. In
addition, Judge Bright found no combination between the defen-
dant and its other dealers and emphasized that even if he had
found a combination, it would have been irrelevant to the plain-
tiff's claim because the plaintiff operated without any real
competition.1
5 4
Arnott is one of the best illustrations of the argument that
RPM often operates procompetitively. The unilateral or conspira-
torial nature of the activity is irrelevant in Arnott. The defendant
merely sought to control the plaintiff's exorbitant profits and
thereby protect the plaintiff's customers and the defendant from
the plaintiff's monopolistic pricing policy. The court's disallowance
of RPM plainly injured the defendant by defeating its right to
lease payments and by injuring its reputation for competitive
pricing.
III. DISADVANTAGES OF THE PER SE RULE
Proponents of the per se rule argue that it precludes difficult
and costly litigation of antitrust issues, efficiently contributes to
enforcement, provides predictable results for planning purposes,
150. 609 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 918 (1980).
151. Id. at 893 (Bright, J., concurring and dissenting).
152. Id. at 891 n.6.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 892.
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and saves courts from engaging in unwieldy economic analysis. 155
In evaluating the effects of the rule, however, its inequities in the
RPM setting outweigh its justifications. The problems courts have
faced in attempting to apply the per se rule to RPM cases include:
(1) the producer's loss of marketing control; (2) distortion of the
role of the combination requirement; (3) disallowance of procom-
petitive activities; (4) encouragement of free riders; and (5) unpre-
dictability. This part of the Note considers each of these disadvan-
tages in turn.
A. Loss of Marketing Control
Manufacturers may desire vertical price restraints for several
reasons.15 First, manufacturers may want to discourage "free rid-
ing"-one seller usurping its competitors' services and advertis-
ing.15 7 Second, RPM permits producers and dealers to form car-
tels.15 8 Third, the manufacturer may want to increase nonprice
competition and output if its output is not responsive to changes
in price.1 59 Fourth, the manufacturer may produce a "status sym-
bol" product that sells better at a higher price than at a lower
price.'60 Last, manufacturers believe that they should be able to
maintain a diverse retailer group because one retailer that consist-
ently sells a product for less than its competitors may reduce re-
tailer competition and gain bargaining strength against the
manufacturer.' 6'
155. See Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Case for a Per Se Rule
Against Vertical Price Fixing, 71 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1489 (1983); Redlich, The Burger Court
and the Per Se Rule, 44 ALB. L. REV. 1, 4 (1979); Note, supra note 31, at 708.
156. See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 645-49 (1981).
157. For a discussion of the free rider debate, see infra text accompanying notes 185-
95.
158. Proponents of the per se rule argue that the desire to form cartels is the only
possible motive for RPM. See Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L.
& ECON. 86, 96-99, 104 (1960).
159. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 157-58 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
see also Posner, supra note 36, at 291 (analyzing Albrecht). This purpose infers some degree
of market power. Increasing nonprice competition gives rise to an independent cause of ac-
tion under the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1982).
160. See Scherer, supra note 10, at 695-96; see also Fitzgerald, Antitrust, Discounting,
and RPM in the Sporting-Goods Industry: A "Chicago" Reply to Professor Baxter, 14 AN-
TITRUST L. & ECON. REV., No. 3, at 43, 56 (1982) (discussing pricing tendencies in the ski
equipment industry).
161. See Mattioli, Resale Price Fixing and the "Hi-Tech" Discounter: Consumer
Electronics in Madison, 14 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV., No. 3, at 11, 20-22, 28-29 (1982).
The advantage of RPM in this situation is that manufacturers do not have an obligation to
cater to large distributors that control certain markets. The product becomes accessible to a
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Although not all manufacturer ends are procompetitive, some
commentators argue that the overwhelming effect of RPM is bene-
ficial to the market. Professor Bork, for example, feels that RPM is
always beneficial to consumers because a manufacturer would in-
voke RPM only to increase its output. More consumers, therefore,
must be willing to buy the new product-services package than were
willing to buy the product alone at a lower price.162 Professor Bork
would argue that the manufacturer is responding to a greater de-
mand than it could before it instituted RPM.16 3 To the extent that
RPM may have procompetitive effects, the per se rule is too blunt
a weapon against anticompetitive RPM.
The basis of most judicial and scholarly criticism of RPM is
that it promotes supplier or dealer cartels. According to this view,
dealers can influence their suppliers to implement price restric-
tions because the suppliers can eliminate competition by establish-
ing a price, policing noncomplying sellers, and punishing dis-
counters by terminating their accounts."' At the manufacturer
level, stabilized prices that are easily monitored by competitors
could promote a manufacturer cartel.1
65
Although cartelization is a possible motive for RPM cam-
paigns, 6  forming cartels is also independently actionable under
the Sherman Act. 67 In maximum price fixing cases, cartelization is
rarely the manufacturer's intention. 68 In minimum RPM cases, a
manufacturer level cartel is easily noticeable by the lack of inter-
brand competition among different products.' 9 An RPM cartel im-
posed at the dealer level would be unusual because retailers rarely
greater number of retailers that can expand the ultimate consumer base. Strong arguments
to the contrary exist, however. For example, one commentator criticizes this system because
it requires discount or other low cost sellers to raise prices, thereby preventing manufactur-
ers from maximizing their profits. This system encourages new entrants to squeeze the vol-
ume of the original retailers and creates a free rider problem. See F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL
MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 593 (2d ed. 1980); Halverson, An Overview
of Legal and Economic Issues and the Relevance of the Vertical Merger Guidelines, 52
ANTITRUST L.J. 49, 71 (1983).
162. R. BORK, supra note 21, at 288-89; Bork, supra note 128, at 180-81.
163. Bork, supra note 128, at 181.
164. See Lifland, Pitofsky & Popofsky, Panel Discussion, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 50, 51, 53
(1982); Pitofsky, supra note 155, at 1490-91.
165. See Pitofsky, supra note 155, at 1490-91.
166. One commentator, however, has claimed that this idea is "an hypothesis without
empirical data to support it." Popofsky, supra note 113, at 115.
167. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982); see United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898);
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
168. See Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 886, 900-04 (1981).
169. See Bork, supra note 128, at 190-91; Posner, supra note 19, at 8.
[Vol. 38:163
RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
are able to force a large seller into a conspiracy to restrain trade.
Furthermore, dealers could form a cartel more efficiently without
manufacturer involvement.170 A rebuttable presumption that the
RPM scheme is illegal would allow courts to detect and restrain
cartels in the preliminary stages of litigation. The possibility that
abuse could occur in limited instances does not justify the all en-
compassing per se rule.'
7 '
B. The Definition of Combination
The Supreme Court has expanded its original application of
the per se rule against RPM from express contracts 72 to an amor-
phous prohibition of all manufacturer actions designed to set re-
sale prices, except announcements of pricing policy and manufac-
turer termination of or refusal to deal with discounters.17 3 The
confusion in interpreting the terms "combination," "coercion,"
"agreement," and "acquiescence" arises, therefore, because the Su-
preme Court has failed to indicate when Colgate applies and be-
cause lower courts are dissatisfied with the inflexible per se rule.
7 4
For example, in Filco v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc.7 5 the Ninth
Circuit's requirement that the plaintiff comply, at least momenta-
rily, with its manufacturer's demands to prove acquiescence is a
frivolous, possibly damaging prerequisite to suit. The result in
Filco is disturbing in view of the court's ultimate decision that the
defendant was not liable.
Russell Stover aptly illustrates the various ways in which
courts have manipulated Colgate to achieve an equitable result.1
7 6
170. Bork, supra note 128, at 190-91.
171. See Posner, supra note 19, at 8. Under Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1 (1958), a court may impose the per se rule only if the activity has a "pernicious
effect on competition." Id. at 5.
172. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
173. See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960). But cf. Monsanto
Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 104 S. Ct. 1464 (1984) (implying future restriction of Dr.
Miles). See generally supra notes 18-93 and accompanying text (tracing the evolution in the
Supreme Court's reasoning).
174. According to one commentator, "'[a]greement' has become a code word meaning
only that the manufacturer has pursued its price preferences with an unacceptable vigor."
Andersen, supra note 34, at 772; see Kilburn, supra note 136, at 178-79; cf. Knutson v. Daily
Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977) (no coercion
because the defendant relied on its dealer's individual self-interest to ensure pricing uni-
formity); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. CX Processing Laboratories, Inc., 523 F.2d 668 (9th
Cir. 1975) (no conspiracy because no direct evidence of pricing demands).
175. 709 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 385 (1983).
176. Russell Stover Candies, Inc. v. FTC, 718 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1983), rev'g 100
F.T.C. 1 (1982); see supra notes 129-49 and accompanying text (discussing Russell Stover).
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Limiting judicial review of the record to facts that support the Col-
gate defense before deciding whether to apply the per se rule is an
intellectually dishonest, potentially anticompetitive approach to
RPM cases. 1" Colgate and its progeny have created in the combi-
nation requirement a blunt, irresponsible weapon against the per
se rule.
The time honored principle underlying Colgate-that manu-
facturers have the right to select with whom and under what cir-
cumstances they will do business-is still the basic concern of the
combination requirement. 178 Courts more likely would stick to Col-
gate's basic premise in RPM cases if they were not searching for a
vehicle by which to insert rule of reason analysis. Because the re-
buttable presumption of illegality that this Note proposes179 allows
full rule of reason inquiry into cases that overcome the initial pre-
sumption, the rebuttable presumption would restore clarity and in-
tegrity to the Colgate doctrine.
C. Disallowance of Procompetitive or Benign Activities
Proponents of the rule of reason argue that manufacturer-ini-
tiated RPM is always procompetitive or benign. They assert that
increases in interbrand competition compensate for reductions in
intrabrand competition.18 0 Commentators also postulate numerous
manufacturer benefits that have procompetitive, or at least benign,
effects.' 8 ' Maximum price restraints have great potential for lower-
ing consumer prices, although the Albrecht decision failed to rec-
ognize this potential as sufficient to overcome per se treatment.
Several results that are helpful to the consumer may flow from
minimum RPM as well. For example, minimum pricing may en-
courage national advertising of prices and dealer services; new or
small manufacturers may set minimum prices to allow dealers a
177. Other means that courts have used to avoid the per se rule include refusing to
find sufficient evidence of conspiracy or pricing demands, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
CX Processing Laboratories, Inc., 523 F.2d 668, 673-74 (9th Cir. 1975), and refusing to find
sufficient levels of coercion, e.g., Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795, 806 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977).
178. Many scholars, however, disagree with this principle and would discard Colgate,
even under rule of reason analysis. See, e.g., Andersen, supra note 34, at 792-93; Baker,
supra note 21, at 1520; Turner, supra note 52, at 695, 705-06.
179. See infra notes 238-52 and accompanying text.
180. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). But see An-
dersen, supra note 34, at 784 ("If enhancing interbrand competition were an adequate justi-
fication for eliminating intrabrand competition, horizontal arrangements for this purpose
should be allowed.").
181. See R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 147-51 (1976).
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temporary increase in profits and thereby encourage marketing;
and "status" products may receive protection against price cut-
ters.' These apparent efficiencies, however, may not be as com-
prehensive as commentators suggest. A leading economist contends
that RPM is inefficient when increased services are unnecessary to
market a product or when price margins are unnecessarily high.1 83
In addition, in certain highly concentrated industries RPM may
inhibit low price substitution. 8 4 The wide divergence of opinion
about the effects of RPM on competition indicates the need for a
flexible judicial response to RPM cases.
D. Free Riders
The free rider effect has provided strong ammunition for
scholars who advocate abolishing the per se rule.8 5 Recent evalua-
tion of the problem, however, suggests that it may not be as severe
as critics once thought. 8 6 Briefly stated, disallowing minimum
RPM encourages low price sellers to take a free ride on the services
and advertising of retail competitors that charge higher prices to
finance those services. RPM, on the other hand, forces dealers to
maintain prices that (1) discourage consumers from using one
seller's services to learn about a product and then buying the prod-
uct from a discount seller and (2) encourage full service marketing
by all retailers.1
8 7
In the marketplace the free rider argument has lost much of
its credibility. Dean Pitofsky, who has made the most damaging
attack on the theory, feels that it is invalid for three reasons. 88
First, he argues that the free rider concept targets discounters,
which as a group represent the free market system at its best be-
cause discount prices generally reflect efficient distribution and ef-
182. See R. BORK, supra note 21, at 288-90, 295-96; Andersen, supra note 34, at 779-
80.
183. See Scherer, supra note 10, at 691-705. Professor Scherer cites the case of regu-
lated airline rates, which artificially upheld prices, to illustrate the theory that excessive
service competition-more than consumers possibly wanted or needed-may produce ineffi-
ciencies. Id. at 703-04. Likewise, inefficiency results when high volume retailers feel that
they must raise prices above profit maximizing levels. Id. at 701.
184. Id. Under a minimum RPM plan, consumers have few, if any, choices of low
priced goods with less service to substitute for the full service product. Id. at 704.
185. For one of the most cited expositions on the free rider theory, see Telser, supra
note 158, at 89-96.
186. See, e.g., Pitofsky, supra note 155, at 1493; Scherer, supra note 10, at 694-95.
187. See Andersen, supra note 34, at 779-80.
188. Pitofsky, supra note 155, at 1492-93.
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ficient services.18 9 Second, Pitofsky contends that the establish-
ment of minimum vertical price restrictions does not induce
automatically the desired services; 190 contract provisions are a
more direct, less intrusive means of achieving the appropriate mar-
keting services.19' Third, Pitofsky believes that the marketplace,
not the manufacturer, is best suited to decide the amount and type
of services that consumers want. 92 In other words, consumers
ought to have the freedom to choose between discounters, depart-
ment stores, and specialty shops to determine the amount and type
of services that they desire.193 Discounters and theorists perceive
almost no evidence to support the claim that consumers take ad-
vantage of a retailer's services before buying instead from a dis-
count retailer.19 4 In addition, many commentators question how
much service is necessary to sell items such as light bulbs, clothing,
liquor, and candy.9 5 Thus, the free rider problem, standing alone,
is not as strong an argument against the per se rule as it once was.
E. Unpredictable Advice and Planning
Although one of the great advantages of a strict per se rule in
RPM cases is that it yields predictable results, two factors create
uncertainty in the application of the rule. First, the Colgate doc-
trine is a shapeless specter in virtually every RPM adjudication.'96
Second, Sylvania's rule of reason approach to nonprice restrictions
189. Id. Discounters claim that they provide equivalent but more efficient services.
See, e.g., Fitzgerald, supra note 160, at 68-70; Mattioli, supra note 161, at 1718; Milley, The
High Cost of RPM: Discounting, Manufacturing, and the Scale-Economy Problem, 14 AN-
TITRUST L. & ECON. REV., No. 3, at 101, 106 (1982) (Mr. Milley is a senior vice president of
K-Mart Corp., one of the nation's largest discount retailers.).
190. Pitofsky, supra note 155, at 1493. In less than ideal situations, such as inflexible
demand at the retail level or heavily concentrated markets, the dealers still may not per-
form the desired services. See Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price
Vertical Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 20 (1978).
191. Pitofsky, supra note 155, at 1493; see Walton, Antitrust, RPM, and the Big
Brands: Discounting in Small Town America, 14 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV., No. 3, at 81,
90 (1982) (Mr. Walton is a senior vice president of Wal-Mart, Inc.). Examples of contract
provisions include manufacturer-retailer agreements over the desired amounts to spend on
advertising, warranty services, samples, or floor display space.
192. Pitofsky, supra note 155, at 1493; see Mattioli, supra note 161, at 30.
193. See Walton, supra note 191, at 90.
194. See Fitzgerald, supra note 160, at 68-70; Scherer, supra note 10, at 694; Wysocki,
Resale Price Maintenance and the Mass Market: A 'Repeat Business' Rebuttal to Profes-
sor Baxter, 14 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV., No. 3, at 91, 99 (1982).
195. See Scherer, supra note 10, at 694; Walton, supra note 191, at 90.
196. Because Colgate is the only viable defense in most per se cases, the vast majority
of cases discuss the issue.
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leads to inconsistent judicial treatment in both combined RPM
and territorial restriction cases 197 and single system cases that do
not fit into a particular category.' 98 The illogical line drawing in
the Supreme Court's vertical restraint decisions thwarts rational
business planning.199
Courts have limited Colgate so that it not only confuses busi-
ness planning, but also discourages producers from terminating
dealers for any kind of unsatisfactory conduct for fear of potential
liability to dealers that can convince courts of even tenuous RPM
strategies.2 00 This fear is not irrational considering that some
courts have allowed liability for conduct that has little or nothing
to do with dual consent. 01
F. Other Effects
The existence of the per se rule makes a game of achieving a
potentially procompetitive RPM equivalent through alternate ave-
nues. A manufacturer may communicate its resale goals through
catalogues, price lists, advertising with price included, or prepric-
ing packages.0 2 The per se rule, therefore, impedes efficient com-
munication of both procompetitive and anticompetitive marketing
strategies.
The final major effect of the per se rule is that it protects dis-
197. See, e.g., Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742 (7th Cir.
1982); see supra note 149 (discussing Valley Liquors).
198. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 21, at 1467.
199. See R. BORK, supra note 21, at 297 (contending that current law denies the man-
ufacturer the opportunity to increase efficiency).
200. See, e.g., Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105 (3d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. CX Processing Labora-
tories, Inc., 523 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1975). Professor Andersen rebuts this contention by argu-
ing in favor of imposing a duty to do business with dealers. Andersen, supra note 34, at 790.
201. See Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1982), aff'd,
104 S. Ct. 1464 (1984); Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Ander-
sen, supra note 34, at 777.
Although a rebuttable presumption of illegality alone would not correct all predictabil-
ity problems, see Popofsky, Lawyer's Response, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 719, 729 (1983), it proba-
bly would return Colgate to its original purpose and end silent judicial manipulations of the
per se rule. Dean Levi summed up the current state of legal planning of RPM in 1960:
[I]t is a matter of concern that the law should have failed to provide itself with a
meaningful structure of theory. Beyond this, it is a matter of concern also that in an
area involving important commercial practice the law should have developed so as to
appear to put a premium on the avoidance of words which describe what the parties
clearly intend. This must seem strange and degrading to men who take pride in their
given word, and it fosters a caricatured view of the law.
Levi, supra note 75, at 326.
202. See Russell Stover, 100 F.T.C. at 4-5 (1982); Andersen, supra note 34, at 765-66.
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counters against manufacturers' forced price increases. Discount
retail businesses now do an estimated one hundred to three hun-
dred billion dollars worth of retail sales business a year.2 3 Before
repeal of the fair trade laws, one discounter estimated that forty to
fifty percent of the retail market of television sets was minimum
price restricted.204 Under the rule of reason,20 5 RPM would in-
crease prices and restrict discounter markets geographically be-
cause discounters depend on low prices to draw customers from a
wider area than if the discounters did not offer reduced prices.
206 If
discounters cannot reduce their prices, volume also will decrease,
causing lower manufacturer volume discounts and lower profit
margins for the discounters.0 7 This chain of events restricts dis-
counter bargaining power, giving the manufacturer an extra dimen-
sion of control over its prices.20 s The inescapable conclusion is that
the rule of reason provides too liberal a standard. The rebuttable
presumption compromise offers the right balance of interests to
ensure the continued existence of the discount retail industry be-
cause the rebuttable presumption prohibits systems that severely
affect competition and protects retailer interests.
IV. THE RULE OF REASON
Although the Supreme Court has not applied rule of reason
analysis to RPM cases, no discussion of the shortcomings of the
per se rule would be complete without an analysis of all the alter-
natives to the per se standard, including the rule of reason. The
rule of reason is a totality of the circumstances approach to resolv-
ing antitrust cases. The exact standard for reviewing each case is
not readily definable. Accordingly, inquiries and lawsuits under the
rule of reason may be protracted, difficult, unpredictable, and ex-
pensive. The advantage of the rule is that it can react to new fact
situations and balance the procompetitive and anticompetitive ef-
fects of a challenged activity. Unlike the per se rule the rule of
reason does not assume that the anticompetitive effects always
outweigh the procompetitive results. The disadvantage of the rule
203. See Foreword: Antitrust and the Discounters' Case Against Resale Price Main-
tenance, 14 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. No. 3, at 1, 4 (1982).
204. Mattioli, supra note 161, at 15.
205. The rule of reason, in practice, "is little more than a euphemism for nonliability."
Posner, supra note 19, at 14.
206. Mattioli, supra note 161, at 17.
207. Fitzgerald, supra note 160, at 67.
208. Walton, supra note 191, at 85.
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lies in the practical difficulties of applying a full rule of reason ap-
proach in every case. The costs to the judicial system, the litigants,
and society outweigh the benefits of the rule in RPM cases. Under
the rule of reason, antitrust counsel has free reign to manufacture
countless reasons why virtually any RPM scenario may benefit
competition. The rule of reason is the polar opposite of the per se
rule and each test has significant disadvantages. A rebuttable pre-
sumption that the RPM scheme is illegal, on the other hand, would
limit rule of reason marathons to cases in which the defendant's
justifications for the RPM scheme are strong enough to overcome
the presumption. 0 9
A. Judicial Interpretations of the Rule of Reason
The rule of reason approach that antitrust tribunals currently
use adds little to planning predictability and even less to the de-
velopment of one standard that all the federal appellate courts can
employ. For example, in Sylvania210 the Supreme Court listed sev-
eral inquiries in its rule of reason test, including the nature of the
restraint on competition, the factual business context, the condi-
tion of the business before and after the restraint, the purpose and
history of the restraint, and the knowledge or intent of the defen-
dant.21' This list is not of practical assistance to the lower federal
courts because it does not establish priorities nor does it provide a
fulcrum on which to evaluate the facts of each case.212
Judge Posner articulated a new approach to rule of reason
analysis in Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd.21 -the
significant market power test. This test holds that a firm without
market power is not in a position to disserve customers and, there-
fore, is presumably not guilty of anticompetitive activity.21 4 The
Valley Liquors test is consistent with Sylvania215 in that Valley
209. A presumption against legality follows from the view that over 50% of all cases
that go to trial involve conduct antithetical to the interests of competition. Studies con-
ducted under the Fair Trade Laws indicate that most RPM systems result in increased
prices and reduced sales volume. Halverson, supra note 161, at 69-70; Pitofsky, supra note
155, at 1488.
210. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
211. Id. at 49 n.15 (citing Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238
(1918)).
212. Accord Pitofsky, supra note 190, at 34 (indicating that the technique of listing
unweighted factors is "standard operating procedure").
213. 678 F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 1982); see supra note 149 (discussing Valley Liquors).
214. 678 F.2d at 745.
215. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 58 & n.29.
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Liquors allows new or weak competitors to be anticompetitive.
This exception to liability may be justifiable if it increases inter-
brand competition.216 The major obstacle to implementing the Val-
ley Liquors test is its restrictive definition of market power. Ac-
cording to Valley Liquors, the defendant has market power when
* it can "raise prices significantly above the competitive level with-
out-losing all of [its] business. 217 This definition of market power
is the greatest weakness in the test because the definition almost
presupposes a section 2 monopoly violation. 218 This threshold fails
to protect retailer and consumer interests adequately.
In Muenster Butane, Inc. v. Stewart CO. 219 the Fifth Circuit
phrased its inquiry as a straight balancing of intrabrand versus in-
terbrand effects on competition.220 The court held that a bitter ri-
valry between the plaintiff dealer and its across the street competi-
tor had cut competitive efficiencies, and that the defendant's
refusal to do business with the plaintiff encouraged presale services
and thus restored full interbrand competition. 22' The court did not
explicitly adopt a market share analysis, but considered the defen-
dant's lack of market power as a "plus factor" in the decision.222
The court's loose treatment of market share, in comparison with
the Valley Liquors analysis, illustrates the conflicts inherent in
rule of reason cases.
223
B. The Academic Response
Several commentators have addressed the question of the
proper standard in RPM cases. Dean Pitofsky defends the per se
rule, although he concedes the need for carefully drawn exceptions,
216. But see Scherer, supra note 10, at 697-704 (If new entrants feel that they must
set their prices beyond profit maximizing levels, increases in output will decrease overall
efficiency.).
217. 678 F.2d at 745.
218. In other words, before the defendant could violate the Valley Liquors standard,
the defendant would be guilty of monopolizing under the Sherman Act. Section 2 of the Act
prohibits monopolizing any relevant market. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). Although the court must
find market power in combination with intent to monopolize to find a violation of the Act,
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966), the Valley Liquors threshold
places a severe limit on the types of defendants that would ever be liable for vertical re-
straint violations. The practical effect of the test is to open the door for manufacturers to
design combined systems of restricted distribution and RPM without fear of judicial
prohibition.
219. 651 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981).
220. Id. at 296.
221. Id. at 297.
222. Id. at 298.
223. See Posner, supra note 19, at 14.
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such as the exception for new entrants and weak competitors.224
Judge Posner believes that the new entrant or small firm exception
is part of an inquiry into attempts at forming cartels.225 Under
Posner's approach, if the defendant does not have a high market
share, presumably the defendant is not attempting to form a car-
tel.228 This approach assumes that RPM is always procompetitive
or benign, because any activity short of a violation of the Sherman
Act is allowable.227 Other scholars have adopted a similar high
market share threshold requirement.228 Discount retailers, of
course, would disagree with this line of reasoning.229
The notion that RPM is always beneficial fails to consider
cases in which the parties set prices above the profit maximization
level of high efficiency dealers.230 In these cases RPM necessarily
creates inefficiency. Likewise, when competing manufacturers en-
gage in RPM on their own, the effect may be tantamount to form-
ing a cartel.2 3'
C. A Suggested Approach to Rule of Reason Analysis
The obvious problem with the broad rule of reason approach
is that full inquiry in every case is time consuming and expensive
to both the litigants and the judicial system. Under the rebuttable
presumption of illegality, however, courts would apply rule of rea-
son analysis only if the defendant fulfills its burden of establishing
with reasonable probability a competitive justification for its RPM
program. How should a court focus its inquiry under the rule of
reason in this second part of the rebuttable presumption standard?
Most academic suggestions in this field present two problems.
224. Pitofsky, supra note 155, at 1495.
225. Posner, supra note 19, at 17.
226. Id.
227. See R. BORK, supra note 21, at 288.
228. See, e.g, Popofsky, supra note 201, at 725.
229. See Mattioli, supra note 161, at 38-42 (denying that RPM promotes consumer
welfare).
230. See Scherer, supra note 10, at 701.
231. Id. at 703. Professor Scherer contends:
When one looks at a single manufacturer imposing vertical restraints upon its distribu-
tors in a way that maximizes the distributors' profits, then one can infer from the fact
that output has increased, that efficiency is likely to have increased. If, on the other
hand, you get a race among numerous rivalrous manufacturers to raise margins and
increase the level of non-price competition, then the results are ambiguous. It may well
be that efficiency has increased: that the gain to consumers outweighs the additional





First, scholars emphasize consumer welfare to the virtual exclusion
of all other factors.232 Courts also must consider the interests of
the dealer and manufacturer to achieve the equitable results that
the rule of reason envisions. Dealer and manufacturer interests do
not add any additional uncertainty or undue complexity to the
analysis. 3 Second, the economic assumption that RPM necessa-
rily increases efficiency is not persuasive, considering the cases of
high volume discounters, products in concentrated industries, and
other special fact situations.234
The primary goal of the rule of reason approach should be to
maintain and promote consumer interests. Consumer welfare is the
first, but not singular, goal of antitrust law. Courts should use the
Sylvania test, which balances decreases in intrabrand competition
against increases in interbrand competition, as the primary inquiry
under the rule of reason approach.235 Judge Posner's significant
market power test is a helpful guide to determine the effects of the
rule of reason approach.236 Posner's test, however, must allow in-
jured plaintiffs an opportunity to restrain the RPM scheme or gain
restitution. The test of significant market power, therefore, should
be whether the defendant possesses sufficient power materially to
affect a material change in price and consumer interests in the geo-
graphic product market. Courts should read the main purpose of
this flexible standard to give plaintiffs full opportunity to prove
anticompetitive activity. Courts also should inquire into the con-
centration of the product market to determine the defendant's
power.
There are three secondary, or "tipping" factors, in the pro-
posed rule of reason: (1) the independent, proprietary interests of
the dealers subject to the RPM; (2) the interests of the manufac-
232. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 21, at 66; Baker, supra note 21, at 1458; Easter-
brook, supra note 168, at 888.
233. According to one commentator:
Those opposed to the inclusion of political factors [such as excessive economic concen-
tration and retailer interests] exaggerate the precision of an enforcement approach that
incorporates solely economic concerns, and overstate the administrative difficulties and
enforcement costs of taking noneconomic concerns into account.
[A]ntitrust enforcement along economic lines already incorporates large doses
of hunch, faith, and intuition.
Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1051, 1065 (1979).
234. See Scherer, supra note 10, at 697-705.
235. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51-57 (1977); see supra
notes 119-28 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 149 (Valley Liquors).
[Vol. 38:163
RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
turer in marketing its product; and (3) whether the dealer, the
manufacturer, or third parties would be in danger of substantial
economic injury or hardship if the court ruled against them.
2 37
These elements embrace more than consumer welfare inter-
ests-they consider the interests of small and large retailers and
manufacturers, who also merit protection under the Sherman Act.
V. THE SOLUTION: A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION OF ILLEGALITY
A. Why a Rebuttable Presumption?
The rule of reason, while the most economically precise ap-
proach, is too unwieldy a tool to use in every RPM inquiry. The
per se rule, however, imposes a far heavier burden on manufactur-
ers and, less directly, consumers. The rebuttable presumption
23
" of
illegality is a middle ground that balances the interests of the par-
ties, the consumer, and the system of judicial administration. The
use of a rebuttable presumption against legality is justifiable on
several grounds. First, the Supreme Court in Sylvania refused to
apply the rule of reason approach to RPM because the Court felt
that when Congress repealed the fair trade laws, it expressed a
general policy against RPM. The Court also found that RPM tends
to encourage the formation of cartels and decrease interbrand com-
petition.23 ' The major premise of a rebuttable presumption is that
more often than not, the defendant either is guilty of anticompeti-
ti~e conduct or has greater access to the facts necessary to show
that its RPM system was reasonable.240 Even Assistant Attorney
General Baxter, champion of the movement to permit RPM, con-
cedes that RPM may have harmful effects, especially the forming
of cartels in concentrated industries.241
A Senate subcommittee study of the fair trade laws showed
that "minimum vertical price agreements lead to higher, and usu-
237. Recently, the Seventh Circuit considered these three elements in its rule of rea-
son analysis of an exclusive dealing complaint. See Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc.,
No. 84-1509 (7th Cir. Aug. 31, 1984). Judge Posner wrote the opinion.
238. For a definition of rebuttable presumption, see supra note 13.
239. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 51 n.18.
240. One leading commentator has suggested the opposite standard-a rebuttable pre-
sumption of legality. See Turner, supra note 52, at 690. In addition to the argument that a
defendant is likely to be guilty of at least some anticompetitive conduct and is in a better
position to show that its RPM system is reasonable, the presumption of illegality is more
judicially efficient than Professor Turner's suggestion, given the courts' tendency to sympa-
thize with plaintiffs in RPM cases.
241. Letter from William F. Baxter to Edward A. Borda (May 24, 1982), reprinted in
Scherer, supra note 10, at 715 app. [hereinafter cited as Letter from William F. Baxter].
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ally uniform, resale prices. 24 2 In addition, national studies of the
effects of RPM under the lenient fair trade laws reflect a demand
curve that shifted left, signaling decreased output at higher
prices.243 These tendencies demonstrate the second reason for em-
ploying the rebuttable presumption standard: the per se approach
to RPM may stifle procompetitive or benign activities, whereas the
rule of reason approach does not address vigorously the economic
dangers of RPM. For example, when a large RPM firm sells a
product that requires little or no presale services and has a system
of territorial restraints, courts should require the firm to justify its




This Note proposes that courts make a preliminary finding
that the RPM scheme in question has a reasonable chance of pass-
ing the rule of reason. This threshold inquiry discourages plaintiffs
from bringing frivolous lawsuits, but does not allow the cost of liti-
gation to inhibit challenges to alleged anticompetitive acts. At the
same time this requirement permits defendants to defend their
marketing techniques under a clearer standard than the current
per se rule. Courts may act more rapidly than under simple rule of
reason analysis to prevent prolonged consumer injury from an-
ticompetitive RPM. Once the defendant passes the threshold, the
court should use the equitable method of full inquiry according to
the rule of reason approach outlined above. 45
The rebuttable presumption of illegality is a viable compro-
mise between the theoretically optimal rule of reason, which sacri-
fices judicial efficiency, and the per se rule, which sacrifices flex-
ibility for judicial efficiency.246 The Supreme Court may find the
242. Pitofsky, supra note 155, at 1488 (citing Hearings on S. 408 Before the Sub-
comm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 174 (1975)).
243. See Fox, Scherer & Popofsky, Panel Discussion, 52 ANTITRUST L. J. 731, 738
(1983).
244. This hypothetical appears in Tollison, Economic Analysis at the FTC: An Inter-
view (1), 14 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV., No. 4, at 45, 57 (1982).
245. See supra text accompanying notes 232-37.
246. Professor Scherer has suggested the idea of a rebuttable presumption, see Scher-
er, supra note 10, at 707, with exceptions for weak firms or new entrants. These exceptions,
however, are not necessary under a standard that includes the significant market strength
test. Another commentator has concluded that a rebuttable presumption might be a tenta-
tive first step away from the per se rule. See Halverson, supra note 161, at 81.
Professor Bork also proposed an analysis similar to the rebuttable presumption. See
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rebuttable presumption more palatable than the rule of reason be-
cause the presumption is easier to harmonize with precedent.247
This new approach, however, does not solve all the problems inher-
ent in RPM cases. The Court must redefine Colgate to brighten
the line between per se legal conduct and conduct subject to the
rebuttable presumption. Colgate should remain valid only as a rec-
ognition of a manufacturer's right to choose its own terms and
dealers. 248 The presumption would add needed logic and consis-
tency to future opinions and enable courts to avoid further manip-
ulation of irrelevant facts to support perceived equitable results.
C. Advantages of the Rebuttable Presumption
The purpose of antitrust law is to preserve the free market.249
Although several prominent commentators would exclude political
factors 250 from economic policy,251 past decisions, particularly the
Russell Stover court's retention of Colgate, mandate that courts
recognize protectable interests beside consumer welfare. 2  The re-
buttable presumption, if it were to validate a manufacturer's RPM
system only once, would increase marketplace efficiency more than
the per se rule because the rebuttable presumption offers manufac-
turers an additional means to improve competition. In addition,
the rebuttable presumption contains the cost of litigation better
than the rule of reason and respects Congress' distaste for RPM.
Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 75
YALE L.J. 373, 387-90 (1966). Although Bork discounted nonconsumer oriented inquiries, id.
at 378, he proposed a per se rule, supplemented by an exception for defendants that are able
to prove that their conduct was ancillary to a valid contract, id. at 389.
247. The Court, for example, could indicate that the defendant in Dr. Miles would
have been liable under the rebuttable presumption, while retaining the flexibility to limit
past decisions like Parke, Davis to their facts to recognize procompetitive and benign RPM
systems as legal under the proposed standard. Similarly, the Court should retain the Col-
gate doctrine as an exception to the rebuttable presumption test. The Court, however, must
define the content of the doctrine so that manufacturers can implement it in market plan-
ning. Russell Stover provides a good factual definition. In Russell Stover the court held that
it could invoke the Colgate exception because the court found no evidence of a price agree-
ment that represented an implied or express meeting of the minds, systemic policing or
dealer harassment, or economic coercion. See Russell Stover, 718 F.2d at 258-60; see also
Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. at 1470-71 (discussing Colgate).
248. See Monsanto, 104 S. Ct. at 1470-71; see also supra note 44.
249. Letter from William F. Baxter, supra note 241.
250. For an explanation of relevant political factors and the Sherman Act, see Pitof-
sky, supra note 233, at 1051-52, 1065-67.
251. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 19, at 13. But see Pitofsky, supra note 233, at 1051-
52, 1065 (defending the use of noneconomic factors in antitrust cases).
252. See Goldberg, supra note 149, at 444 (discussing the FTC's investigation of
Magnavox and focusing on the competitors' interests).
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Costs to litigants and the judicial system are lower under the re-
buttable presumption than under the per se rule as well. Consum-
ers would benefit also because only truly procompetitive arrange-
ments would overcome the presumption. Finally, unlike the per se
rule and rule of reason, the presumption considers the independent
interests of dealers and manufacturers.
VI. CONCLUSION
The courts must correct the numerous problems that Dr.
Miles' inconsistent progeny have created. The courts, however,
must retain the basic premise of Colgate to ensure the indepen-
dent right of manufacturers to control unilaterally the marketing
of their products. A rebuttable presumption of illegality and a
properly defined rule of reason approach will increase economic ef-
ficiency and protect the interests of litigants, consumers, and the
judicial system more equitably than the present per se rule. Only
through this middle ground approach can antitrust law develop a
logical and practical set of rules in the field of resale price
maintenance.
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